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Thomas Kazen

Hilary Lipka

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The Original Function of Torah Law

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https://thetorah.com/article/the-original-function-of-torah-law

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Thomas Kazen

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Hilary Lipka

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The Original Function of Torah Law

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https://thetorah.com/article/the-original-function-of-torah-law

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The Original Function of Torah Law

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The Original Function of Torah Law

The Torah, in addition to its narratives, also contains laws. Many of these laws, however, do not address the more common, everyday situations that arise in a legal context.[1] Instead, many of the cases that are addressed in the Torah's legal sections appear to be rare or highly unlikely to occur in real life. For example:

1. A woman intervenes to help her husband during a fight by grabbing his opponent’s genitals:

דברים כה:יא כִּי־יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים יַחְדָּו אִישׁ וְאָחִיו וְקָרְבָה אֵשֶׁת הָאֶחָד לְהַצִּיל אֶת־אִישָׁהּ מִיַּד מַכֵּהוּ וְשָׁלְחָה יָדָהּ וְהֶחֱזִיקָה בִּמְבֻשָׁיו. כה:יב וְקַצֹּתָה אֶת־כַּפָּהּ לֹא תָחוֹס עֵינֶךָ.
Deut 25:11 If men are fighting one another and the wife of one draws near to rescue her husband from the hand of the one striking him, and she reaches out and grabs hold of his private parts,[2] 25:12 you shall cut off her hand. Show no pity.[3]

Rare as such an occurrence must have been, the Middle Assyrian Laws (ca. 1076 B.C.E.), a law collection from Israel’s neighbor Assyria, addresses a similar situation:

If a woman should crush a man’s testicle during a quarrel, they shall cut off one of her fingers. And even if the physician should bandage it, but the second testicle then becomes infected (?) along with it and becomes inflamed (?), or if she should crush the second testicle during the quarrel—they shall tear out both her [...]-s.[4]

While there are differences between these laws, they both concern the punishment for a woman who grabs a man’s testicles during a fight. One can’t help but wonder if this was something that occurred often enough that not only one, but two neighboring cultures felt the need to include a law about what to do in this situation, or if something else going on here.

2. If a pregnant bystander is injured during a fight and miscarriage results:

שמות כא:כב וְכִי־יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים וְנָגְפוּ אִשָּׁה הָרָה וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ וְלֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן עָנוֹשׁ יֵעָנֵשׁ כַּאֲשֶׁר יָשִׁית עָלָיו בַּעַל הָאִשָּׁה וְנָתַן בִּפְלִלִים.
Exod 21:22 When men fight, and one of them pushes a pregnant woman and a miscarriage results, but no other damage ensues, the one responsible shall be fined according as the woman’s husband may exact from him, the payment to be based on reckoning.[5]

Rare as this situation must have been, the Laws of Hammurabi (ca. 1750 B.C.E.),[6] The Middle Assyrian Laws,[7] the Laws of Lipit-Ishtar (ca. 1930 B.C.E.),[8] and the Hittite Laws (ca. 1650-1500 B.C.E.)[9] also have provisions for what the consequences should be if a pregnant woman is struck and suffers miscarriage (or other harm) during a fight.[10]

3. An entire cluster of laws address what should happen if an ox gores and kills a man or a woman, a child or a slave (Exodus 21:28-32).[11] This set of laws might suggest that oxen were goring people all the time in ancient Israel. This belief might be confirmed upon learning that several of Israel’s Near Eastern neighbors had a similar series of laws involving goring oxen.[12] Although the terms used are generic and may refer to breeding bulls,[13] it is highly unlikely that goring bovines of whatever kind posed a lethal threat of such magnitude as suggested by the room given to the goring ox laws in various legal collections.

This raises the question: What was the purpose of Torah law and, related to this, what is the relationship between Torah law and actual legal practice in ancient Israel?

Clues from Israel’s Neighbors

That Torah law shares commonalities with the law collections of its neighbors reflects the extent to which Israel was part of the broader ancient Near Eastern cultural and intellectual milieu in relation to legal thought.[14]

While we have no legal records from ancient Israel to compare with the content of the Torah laws to see how closely they may or may not correspond,[15] thousands of legal records (mostly in the form of contracts, court records, and administrative documents) have been preserved from neighboring Mesopotamia. None of these legal records refers to any of the Mesopotamian law collections, nor do they judge according to them.[16] It seems, therefore, that the ancient Near Eastern law collections were not used for judicial purposes.

Rather than being used by judges for deciding individual cases, these law collections were probably used for the education of a scribal and intellectual elite, serving a pedagogical function. They were meant to foster a sense of justice and an understanding of difficult or borderline cases,[17] offering illustrative examples and theoretical exercises rather than functioning as binding legal codes.[18]

Like its ancient Near Eastern counterparts, Torah law also seems to have been largely meant for the education of a scribal and intellectual elite, rather than used systematically by judges for the purpose of legislation.[19] This is reflected in the lack of specific instructions for judges, which is something one would expect if they were intended to serve as actual judicial guidelines.[20]

Indeed, biblical narrative texts, while limited, provide no indication that Torah laws were referred to when deciding legal cases.[21]

Torah Law is Descriptive, Not Prescriptive

This is not to say that the Torah contains only theoretical examples and has no relation to actual legal practice. Some texts reflect customary practices or ideals based on a particular conception of justice. But this is not identical to being the source for actual legal practice and procedures.[22] There is a difference between seeing the Torah as descriptive of justice, reflecting an already operating norm, and viewing it as prescriptive and absolute, dictating legal practice and overriding previous norms.[23]

The Law of the Torn Animal

The interrelationship between the Torah legal collections illustrates how earlier biblical laws are appropriated and revised by later authors. For example, the law about eating torn animals, which first appears in the Covenant Collection (CC), is contextually modified by the subsequent Deuteronomic law (D) and Holiness Laws (H). All three laws share a common concern, but the three variants reflect diverse practices:

שמות כב:ל וְאַנְשֵׁי־קֹדֶשׁ תִּהְיוּן לִי וּבָשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ לַכֶּלֶב תַּשְׁלִכוּן אֹתוֹ.
Exod 22:30 You shall be holy people to Me: you must not eat flesh torn by beasts in the field; you shall cast it to the dogs.

The two later rules treat their precedents quite freely at the same time as they build upon them. There is no sense of being bound by the letter of previous law:

דברים יד:כא לֹא תֹאכְלוּ כׇל־נְבֵלָה לַגֵּר אֲשֶׁר־בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ תִּתְּנֶנָּה וַאֲכָלָהּ אוֹ מָכֹר לְנׇכְרִי כִּי עַם קָדוֹשׁ אַתָּה לַי־הֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לֹא־תְבַשֵּׁל גְּדִי בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ.
Deut 14:21 You shall not eat anything that has died a natural death; give it to the stranger in your community to eat, or you may sell it to a foreigner. For you are a people consecrated to YHWH your God.

The Holiness Collection only speaks of impurity, not of prohibition:

ויקרא יז:טו וְכׇל־נֶפֶשׁ אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכַל נְבֵלָה וּטְרֵפָה בָּאֶזְרָח וּבַגֵּר וְכִבֶּס בְּגָדָיו וְרָחַץ בַּמַּיִם וְטָמֵא עַד־הָעֶרֶב וְטָהֵר.
Lev 17:15 Any person, whether citizen or stranger, who eats what has died or has been torn by beasts shall wash his clothes, bathe in water, and remain unclean until evening; then he shall be clean

Comparing these instructions from CC, D, and H, in what is most probably their chronological order, we see that they interpret a basic law about not eating carcasses in ways that reflect diverse customary practices. CC’s prohibition is straightforward but limited to torn animals. D extends the rule to include any natural death but allows the meat to non-Israelites. H, in turn, treats strangers and citizens alike but modifies the rule so that consumption of such meat is no longer disallowed; one only incurs an impurity requiring ritual purification. As later versions build on earlier instructions, they exercise quite some freedom in how they adapt previous laws in their own contexts, without being bound by the letter.[24]

Other Modified Laws

We see similar variations among the Torah legal collections in relation to numerous other issues, including:

  • Freeing of Hebrew/Israelite slaves: Exod 20:2-11 (CC), Deut 15:12-18 (D), Lev 25:39-46 (H)[25]
  • Yibbum (Levirate marriage): Deut 25:5 (D) and Lev 18:16 (H) and 20:21 (H)[26]
  • The ma‘aser (tithe) laws: Lev 18:21-24 (H), Lev 27:30-32 (H), and Deut 14:22-29 (D) and 26:12-13 (D)[27]
  • Sex with a menstruant: Lev 15:19-24 (P) and Lev 18:19 (H) and 20:18 (H)[28]

One could argue that the very modifications found in these laws highlight the importance of the written text, since otherwise there would be little reason for emendation or rewriting. At the same time, later authors felt free to adapt and rework earlier laws either to match current customs of the time or to try to influence them.[29]

This begs the question: when did this understanding of the Torah change? When did Torah law start to be seen as authoritative and legally binding?

The Torah’s Character Transformation and Transition

It was also once thought that the Persian authorization of local laws in the 5th century B.C.E. gave the Torah legal force, transforming the Torah from guidance to binding legal code, in this same time period.[30] Today this theory is less popular and the books of Ezra and Nehemiah, which suggest Persian authority behind the promulgation of the Torah, are increasingly understood to date from (and reflect the concerns of) the later Hellenistic (Greek) period.[31] While Persian policy might have given the emerging Torah additional status, it cannot explain its transformation to normative law.[32]

More likely, only in the beginning of the late Second Temple period (ca. 200 B.C.E.-70 C.E.), under the influence of Greek and Roman culture, did attitudes to the Torah gradually develop in a more judicial direction.

The Greek Influence on Torah Law

During the third century B.C.E., the Ptolemies (a Greek dynasty based in Egypt), who ruled over Judea at the time, carried out a series of reforms which introduced Greek ideals of city states governed by written law and aimed to integrate local laws for local courts.[33]

The period that follows contains the earliest texts that suggest a more prescriptive role for the Torah, and begin to attribute a normative authority to it. The texts include Sirach, 1–2 Maccabees, the Letter of Aristeas, and perhaps also Ezra-Nehemiah.[34] It is also during this period that the Torah is translated into Greek. Still, at this point, the Torah could to a certain extent be updated, revised or rewritten, as several texts from Qumran show.

But the Torah gradually took on a more fixed character. Its instructions were increasingly understood as statutory law that were supplemented and applied with the help of various interpretive techniques.[35]

This shift in how people understood the Torah did not happen all at once, nor did it happen everywhere in the same way. The shift was rather uneven and fluid, and it is precisely this fact that can explain some of the debates and conflicts over Torah interpretation between various groups, including the Pharisees, Sadducees, and those affiliated with the early Jesus movement. There was an extended in-between period of transition, when the Torah morphed from instruction and wisdom to nomos or lex (law) in a Hellenistic and Roman sense.

The Torah Becomes Authoritative

By the time we reach the rabbinic period, the situation has stabilized. The biblical text at this point is established, and there is no more room for rewriting of law to reflect contemporaneous norms. Instead, this is an environment for techniques of halakic exposition to emerge, strategies that do not supersede the law, but interpret and complement it in an independent manner.

If canonicity is understood as the pragmatic outcome of a text’s acquired authority, then the Torah became canon through a process extending across the entire Second Temple period. In the course of that development, the Torah also acquired a judicial role and a normative status that far exceeded its initially formative and instructive function.[36]

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December 2, 2025

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Dr. Hilary Lipka is an instructor in the Religious Studies Program at the University of New Mexico, main campus. She received her M.A. and Ph.D. from the Department of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies at Brandeis University. She is the author of Sexual Transgression in the Hebrew Bible (Sheffield Phoenix Press) and co-editor (with F. Rachel Magdalene and Bruce Wells) of the forthcoming Sexuality and Law in the Torah (Bloomsbury T & T Clark).