A Woman Who Seizes a Man’s Testicles During a Fight, Her Hand Is Cut Off

A wife who intervenes in a fight to save her husband by grabbing his opponent’s testicles is punished by having her hand cut off (Deut 25:11–12). What is the nature of her offense? Why isn’t her intent to save her husband a mitigating factor? What is the relationship between the punishment and the crime?

Dr.

Hilary Lipka

Dr.

Hilary Lipka

Categories:

Ki Teitzei

A Woman Who Seizes a Man’s Testicles During a Fight, Her Hand Is Cut Off

The Law

The case addressed in Deuteronomy 25:11–12 stands out in the Torah, because of both the nature of the offense and the punishment prescribed:

^{דברים כה:יא} כִּי יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים יַחְדָּו אִישׁ וְאָחִיו וְקָרְבָה אֵשֶׁת הָאֶחָד לְהַצִּיל אֶת אִישָׁהּ מִיַּד מַכֵּהוּ וְשָׁלְחָה יָדָהּ וְהֶחֱזִיקָה בִּמְבֻשָׁיו. ^כה:יב וְקַצֹּתָה אֶת כַּפָּהּ לֹא תָחוֹס עֵינֶךָ.

^{Deut 25:11} If men are fighting one another^[1] and the wife of one draws near to rescue her husband^[2] from the hand of the one striking him, and she reaches out and grabs hold of^[3] his private parts, ^25:12 you shall cut off her hand. Show no pity.^[4]

The term מבשים (mevushim) is a hapax legomenon likely derived from the stem ב.ו.שׁ (to feel shame, be ashamed), thus denoting “shameful things/parts” or “that which brings shame,” here used as a euphemism for the male genitalia.^[5] Thus, the woman is trying to stop the man from hurting her husband by squeezing his testicles.

The verb form of ק.צ.צ used in the punishment is unusual. While in its more frequent piel form the verb usually means to cut,^[6] and is used to describe dismemberment,^[7] the qal form used here only occurs three other times in the Hebrew Bible—all in Jeremiah (Jer 9:25; 25:23; and 49:32)—where it refers to foreigners having hair that is cut or trimmed (likely at the temples). Nevertheless, context, plus cognate usage in Akkadian (kaṣaṣu) and Aramaic (קצץ), point to the likelihood that קצץ in the qal can also have the meaning “to cut off.”

The term כף (kaph) comes from the stem כפף, which means “to bend, bow, or be bent, bowed.” It is used most commonly in reference to hands, often referring specifically to the palm (that is, the curved part) of the hand,^[8] and is also commonly used as a synonym of יד (yad) to refer to the whole hand (Exod 33:22, 23; and Isa 59:6).^[9] The reason for the use of כף here as opposed to יד may be to avoid repetition, to clarify that hand is meant and not arm, or perhaps, bring to mind the woman’s grabbing a “handful” of the man’s testicles, highlighting the reason for the sentence.^[10]

An Ancient Near Eastern Parallel

The Middle Assyrian Laws A8, lines 78-87, addresses a case that has several similarities to Deuteronomy 25:11–12:

If a woman should crush a man’s testicle during a quarrel, they shall cut off one of her fingers. And even if the physician should bandage it, but the second testicle then becomes infected (?) along with it and becomes..., or if she should crush the second testicle during the quarrel—they shall cut off both her [...]-s.^[11]

The two laws have several things in common: a woman getting involved in a fight, the strategy of grabbing a man’s testicles, and a punishment involving dismemberment. There are also some noteworthy differences:

Woman’s Identity—In the biblical law, the woman is specifically the wife of one of the men fighting who intervenes to save her husband. In the Assyrian law, no information is given about the woman’s identity, but she appears to be one of the people involved in the fight, not a bystander who intervenes to save someone.

Damage—In the biblical law, no damage to the testicles is specified. In the Assyrian law, it is stated explicitly that the woman has crushed one of the man’s testicles, and there is the possibility that both testicles are damaged.

Mutilation—While both punishments involve mutilation, the form it takes is somewhat different.

The similarities are probably not substantial enough to indicate a direct correlation between the two laws; rather, both were part of a larger common ancient Near Eastern legal tradition, in which case the potential damage to the man’s testicles might have been a consideration for the authors of the biblical law.^[12] This sort of incident likely happened often enough and was considered serious enough that both law collections felt it needed to be addressed.^[13]

Rabbinic Interpretation: Monetary Compensation

The plain sense of the biblical text is that the woman’s hand should actually be cut off, and this is reflected in the Greek and Aramaic translations as well.^[14] Rabbinic literature, however, interprets the phrase as a reference to monetary compensation (b. Baba Qamma 28a):

וקצתה את כפה—ממון.

“You shall cut off her hand”—financially.

This is in keeping with the rabbinic interpretation of the lex talionis,

תניא א"ר יהודה בן דוסתאי: עין תחת עין ממון.

It was taught: R. Judah ben Dostai^[15] said: “‘An eye for an eye’—financially.”

While the rhetoric of “show no pity” strongly implies that the punishment is physical, the midrash uses this very phrase to “prove” that the punishment is monetary, by drawing a literary bridge to the talion law in Deuteronomy (Sifrei Deuteronomy 293):

רבי יהודה אומר: נאמר כאן לא תחס עינך ונאמר להלן לא תחס עינך, מה לא תחס עינך האמור להלן ממון אף לא תחס עינך האמור כאן ממון.

Rabbi Judah says: “It says here ‘Show no pity,’ and it says there (Deut 19:21) ‘show no pity.’ Just as there it refers to monetary compensation, so too here it refers to monetary compensation.”

Monetary compensation is also how Rashi and ibn Ezra understand the passage,^[16] though the latter seems to leave the physical option open as well:

וקצתה את כפה—כמו: עין תחת עין, אם לא תפדה כפה. לא תחוס עינך—אם היתה ענייה.

“Cut off her hand”—This is like “eye for an eye,” if she doesn’t redeem her hand. “Show no pity”—If she is poor.^[17]

Admittedly, precedent exists in the Bible for financial compensation in return for bodily harm, such as when a man causes a miscarriage by striking a pregnant woman.^[18] The Bible also hints that some physical punishments were avoidable by paying a fine.^[19] Nevertheless, as noted above, this interpretation is unlikely: It goes against the plain sense of the text and would leave unexplained the special admonition not to show pity, which makes sense in the context of bodily harm, but not monetary compensation.^[20]

What Is the Relationship Between the Punishment and the Crime?

Scholars throughout the ages have offered a variety of explanations for the special punishment meted out in this law.

To Save the Man’s Life (Rabbinic Interpretation)

One approach, suggested by the 11^th century peshat exegete R. Judah ibn Balaam, is that cutting off her hand is not a punishment at all, but something that is supposed to be done on the spot to the woman to protect the man:

והחזיקה במבושיו – ר"ל מקום שמגיע לו ממנו קלון ובושה, ואם היה מהמקומות המסוכנים, ולא תפתח את ידה, נחתכת בהנצלו ממנה.^[21]

And she grabs his mebhoshim—Meaning a place on his body that will cause him humiliation and embarrassment (Heb. būshah), and if the place she grabs causes him danger, and she won’t let go, [her hand] should be cut off to free him from her.^[22]

Judah ibn Balaam’s reading changes the law extensively, first by saying that it isn’t connected to testicles per se but to endangering the man’s life, and second by saying that cutting off the hand isn’t a punishment but is how they save the man’s testicles from being destroyed. This is also how Gersonides (Rabbi Levi ben Gershom, Ralbag 1288–1344) understands the law.

והחזיקה במבושיו – הוא מקום שיש סכנת נפשות והוא הדין לשאר המקומות שיש בהם סכנת נפשות ולזה יצילהו מידה בעת החזקתה במבושיו בקציצת כפה אם לא יוכלו להצילו בזולת זה.

“She grabs hold of his testicles”—This is a spot which can endanger his life, and the same rule applies to other spots which could pose a danger to his life. For this reason, he is saved from her hand when she is grabbing hold of his testicles by cutting off her hand if they can’t save him without doing this.

This interpretation is even codified by Maimonides in his Mishneh Torah (Book of Damages, “Laws of Murderers and Protection of Life,” 1.8):

אחד מבושיו, ואחד כל דבר שיש בו סכנת נפשות, אחד האיש שאחז את האשה, ענין הכתוב שכל החושב להכות חבירו הכייה הממיתה אותו מצילין את הנרדף בכפו של רודף, ואם אינן יכולין מצילין אותו אף בנפשו, שנ' לא תחוס עינך.

It is the same whether it be “his private parts” or anything that endangers a person’s life. This applies to a man or a woman, and the import of the scriptural passage is that whenever anyone intends to smite his neighbor a mortal blow, one should rescue the person attacked at the cost of the attacker's hand, and if that is not possible one should rescue at the cost of his life. As it is said: “Show no pity.” ^[23]

While this is a creative read, and serves to the make the law sound reasonable, it is not what the text says. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine the woman still refusing to release her grip once she sees men approaching with a blade to cut off her hand.

Instrumental Talion

The simple meaning of the text is that cutting off the hand is a punishment. How, then, does the punishment relate to the offense? The only other place in the Torah which discusses dismemberment as a possible punishment is the lex talionis (an eye for an eye, etc.) in which the punishment is intended to be the equivalent of the damage done to the victim.^[24]

Consequently, the British Assyriologist Sandra Jacobs suggests that this is a case of instrumental talion, “retaliation by means of injury to the body part responsible for initiating, or carrying out, the original assault.”^[25] While we see only a few other cases in biblical law where the punishment reflects the principle of instrumental talion, it is well attested in biblical narrative and poetry (often in the form of “poetic justice”) as well as in ancient Near Eastern law.^[26]

Why Isn’t the Wife’s Intent a Mitigating Factor?

If the wife is trying to save her husband, why then is she punished? The problem bothered the rabbis so much that they reinterpreted the punishment as relevant only in a case in which the wife did not need to do what she did (b. Baba Qamma 28a):

מאי לאו בשאינה יכולה להציל על ידי דבר אחר? לא בשיכולה להציל על ידי דבר אחר אבל אינה יכולה להציל מאי פטורה.

What is the case [in which she is punished]? Is it not even when she could have saved [her husband] in some other way? No, it is when she could have saved him in some other way. If she could not have, then what? She is exempt from punishment.

This is the general assumption of the rabbinic commentators, such as Gersonides, who states:

להציל את אישה מיד מכהו – ולא מיד מכהו נפש כי אז הותר לה להציל בעלה אפילו בנפשו של מכה אותו....

“To rescue her husband from the hand of the one striking him”—but not “smiting him,” since in such case, it would be permitted for her to save her husband even by killing the other man...^[27]

This distinction, however, is not found in the text, which prescribes the punishment in all cases. Perhaps the admonition “show no pity” was added specifically to warn the Israelites not to take her intent into account.

What Was the Woman’s Actual Offense?

The warning to show no pity is used sparingly in Deuteronomy, and each of the other cases in which it appears (Deut 13:9; 19:13; and 19:21) involves a situation in which people might be inclined to feel pity and be hesitant to carry out the punishment:

Idolatry—Deuteronomy 13:7–12 states that if a close family member or friend tries to entice someone to worship other gods, the sentence is stoning, with the person who was approached—who may wish to spare their close friend or relative such a terrible fate—casting the first stone.
Murder—Deuteronomy 19:11–13 concerns someone who committed premeditated murder and then flees to a city of refuge. The elders of his town, who might wish to spare a person who succeeded in making it to their refuge city, must arrange to have him brought back and handed over to the blood avenger, who will put him to death.
False Testimony—Deuteronomy 19:21 sentences a person found guilty of giving false testimony in a criminal case to undergo whatever the sentence would have been, had the defendant been found guilty (using the talionic formula), despite no harm necessarily having come to the victim.

In each scenario there is also an additional explanation as to why the sentence must be carried out, which, in all three cases, relates to the welfare of the community: in the first case, to prevent idolatry from spreading throughout the whole community; in the second, because if they don’t act, the whole community will have bloodguilt upon them; and in the third, because the community cannot be just and righteous if such perniciousness is allowed to exist in its midst.

Given the severity of the other cases in which this admonition appears, the woman's action must have been seen as a grave offence, but what exactly is the nature of it? Several theories have been put forward to explain this:

1. Damage

The woman, through her actions, damaged the man’s testicles (squeezing so hard that she crushed them) or posed the threat of damaging the man’s testicles.

The concern about the potential consequences of such damage to the man’s testicles is twofold. First, it could hinder his ability to father children. Second, permanent damage to his testicles might prohibit him from participating in the Assembly of YHWH (קהל י־הוה), since according to Deuteronomy 23:2, no one with crushed testicles can be admitted into the Assembly.^[28]

This would make the biblical law an exact parallel to the Middle Assyrian Law quoted earlier. Nevertheless, the text never says that the testicles were damaged, and this is not a necessary connotation of the verb חזק in the hiphʿil.^[29] Perhaps the potential threat of damage to his testicles is being addressed.

2. Humiliation

The woman humiliated and shamed the man publicly. Given that the man’s testicles in verse 11 are referred to as מבשים, “shameful things/parts” or “that which brings shame,” a euphemism that appears only here (even though the Bible elsewhere uses many other euphemisms),^[30] shame does seem to be a likely factor. Rashi (ad loc.) identifies this as the central issue:

וקצותה את כפה – ממון דמי בושתו, הכל לפי המבייש והמתבייש.

“You shall cut off her hand”—Rather, you shall make her pay for embarrassing him, all according to who is being shamed and who is doing the shaming.

We have ample evidence that ancient Israel was a culture in which honor and shame were of great concern, tied up with one’s reputation and one’s family’s reputation, and that exposure of the genitalia was considered deeply shaming.^[31] Thus, the woman’s act of not only touching, but grabbing a man’s genitals in public, likely in front of a crowd who had gathered to watch the tussle, was probably deeply humiliating for the man she attacked.^[32]

3. Immodesty

Daring to touch the genitalia of a man other than her husband is an unacceptable act of female boldness and assertiveness, a breach of modesty. The Alexandrian Jewish philosopher Philo (c. 20 B.C.E.–c. 50 C.E.), who in The Special Laws addresses how important it is for women to stay in their spaces and, when they do go out, to behave modestly, alludes to this passage in his discussion of shameless and immodest behavior:

If indeed a woman learning that her husband is being outraged is overcome by the wifely feeling inspired by her love for him and forced by the stress of the emotion to hasten to his assistance, she must not unsex herself by a boldness beyond what nature permits but limit herself to the ways in which a woman can help. For it would be an awful catastrophe if any woman in her wish to rescue her husband from outrage should outrage herself by befouling her own life with the disgrace and heavy reproaches which boldness carried to an extreme entails...

And while all else might be tolerable, it is a shocking thing, if a woman is so lost to a sense of modesty, as to catch hold of the genital parts of her opponent. The fact that she does so with the evident intention of helping her husband must not absolve her. To restrain her over-boldness, she must pay a penalty which will incapacitate herself, if she wishes to repeat the offense, and frighten the more reckless members of her sex into proper behaviour. And the penalty shall be this—that the hand shall be cut off which has touched what decency forbids it to touch.^[33]

Similarly, ibn Ezra describes the act as brazen (עזות מצח), which appears to reflect the same concern.

The Law in Context: Multidetermined

The options presented are not mutually exclusive, and in fact it is likely that several of them played a role in determining what was so troubling about the woman’s action. If we consider this law within the context of the surrounding laws and within the book of Deuteronomy as a whole, it sheds light on what the central concerns of the authors are and what their intent is behind the law.

The Levirate Marriage Law: Damage and Humiliation

The preceding law (Deut 25:5–10) deals with levirate marriage, i.e., the requirement for a brother to marry his late brother’s widow, if they had no children:

^{דברים כה:ו} וְהָיָה הַבְּכוֹר אֲשֶׁר תֵּלֵד יָקוּם עַל שֵׁם אָחִיו הַמֵּת וְלֹא יִמָּחֶה שְׁמוֹ מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל.

^{Deut 25:6} The first son that she bears shall be accounted to the dead brother, that his name may not be blotted out in Israel.^[34]

The concern for perpetuating a man’s progeny here connects with the fear in the next law that the woman grabbing the assailant’s testicles may destroy his ability to have sons to carry on his name and preserve his memory, the most important part of a man’s legacy, and thus would have been of utmost concern.

Another connection between the levirate law and the grabbing-testicle law has to do with the ḥalitza ritual, performed by a woman rejected by her levir, in which she publicly humiliates him:

^{דברים כה:ט} וְנִגְּשָׁה יְבִמְתּוֹ אֵלָיו לְעֵינֵי הַזְּקֵנִים וְחָלְצָה נַעֲלוֹ מֵעַל רַגְלוֹ וְיָרְקָה בְּפָנָיו וְעָנְתָה וְאָמְרָה כָּכָה יֵעָשֶׂה לָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר לֹא יִבְנֶה אֶת בֵּית אָחִיו. ^כה:י וְנִקְרָא שְׁמוֹ בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל בֵּית חֲלוּץ הַנָּעַל.

^{Deut 25:9} His brother’s widow shall go up to him in the presence of the elders, pull the sandal off his foot, spit in his face, and make this declaration: Thus shall be done to the man who will not build up his brother’s house! ^25:10 And he shall go in Israel by the name of “the family of the unsandaled one.”

A woman grabbing the testicles of a man assaulting her husband is publicly shaming him, while also bringing shame upon herself and her husband.^[35]

In the Context of Deuteronomy: Immodesty

The connection to the levirate law supports the theories that suggest that the unusual punishment reflects damage and humiliation, while looking at these laws in the context of Deuteronomy as a whole supports the immodesty theory as well. Deuteronomy emphasizes the importance of maintaining control over women and their behavior, especially as it relates to sexuality (see, e.g., Deut 22:13–29).^[36] Thus, the woman’s actions are likely considered unacceptable and deserving of harsh censure since a man’s wife under no circumstances—even to defend her own husband!— should be handling the genitalia of another man.

Trespassing in YHWH’s Domain

A fourth, subtler theological concern may also be involved. As the British Bible scholar Steffan Mathias observes, in Deuteronomy, fertility and procreation are intertwined with the people’s relationship with YHWH. In fact, they are entirely dependent upon YHWH.^[37]

In the blessings and curses, if the people are faithful to YHWH and follow the (Deuteronomic) Torah, they will be blessed with prosperity, fertility and abundance (see, e.g., Deut 28:4, 11, 12). Infidelity to YHWH and failure to adhere to the Torah results in not only the loss of prosperity, fertility, and abundance, but also in the loss of and destruction of progeny (see, e.g., Deut 28:18; 32; 41; and especially 53-57).^[38]

Because Deuteronomy understands fertility as the province of YHWH, it is part of the realm of the sacred. The woman’s crime in grabbing the man’s testicles, and thus posing a possible threat to his fertility, is trespass not only against the boundary between male and female, but also against the boundary between divine and human. The only entity in the universe that should be granting or taking away procreative ability is YHWH.

TheTorah.com is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization.
We rely on the support of readers like you. Please support us.

Published

August 27, 2020

Last Updated

April 14, 2024

Previous in the Series

Next in the Series

Footnotes

View Footnotes

Published

August 27, 2020

Last Updated

April 14, 2024

[1] The term אח (ach) often means “brother” or denotes some form of kinship relationship in biblical Hebrew, but the expression איש ואחיו (ish ve’achiv) is an idiomatic usage best translated as “one another.” See, e.g., Gen 13:11; Joel 2:8; and Zech 7:9, 10.

[2] While the term איש (ish) generally denotes a man, in every case in the Hebrew Bible in which it appears with the feminine singular possessive, it refers to a woman’s husband. See, e.g., Gen 3:16; Lev 21:7; Num 5:13; Judg 13:6; 1 Sam 1:8; 2 Sam 3:16; and 2 Kgs 4:9.

[3] The verb used to describe the woman’s action, חזק in the hiphʿil, can mean to take hold of, grasp, grab hold of, or seize. It does not necessarily imply physical harm through the act of grabbing or grasping, but it does seem to entail the use of a firm grip. For examples, see note 29.

[4] Literally, “Your eye shall not [look with] pity.” This translation of these verses is my own. The NJPS translation reads, “If two men get into a fight with each other, and the wife of one comes up to save her husband from his antagonist and puts out her hand and seizes him by his genitals, you shall cut off her hand; show no pity.” All other quotes from the Hebrew Bible in this article are from the NJPS translation with adjustments.

[5] The LXX translates τῶν διδύμων αὐτοῦ “his twins,” exchanging one euphemism for another, but the Samaritan Pentateuch reads בבשרו, “his flesh,” which changes the law entirely.

[6] Often it has the sense of cutting off and cutting into pieces. In addition to the usages mentioned above, קצץ in the piel can mean “to cut” (thread in Exod 39:3; a cord in Ps 129:4); cut off (used in 2 Kgs 16:17; 18:16; and 24:13 in reference to items and decorations in the Temple made with precious metals being either cut off or trimmed or stripped of those precious metals); cut or break in half (Ps 46:10); and cut up or cut into pieces (2 Chron 28:24).

[7] See Judg 1:6-7 (thumbs and big toes) and 2 Sam 4:12 (hands and feet).

[8] It is also used for curved, bent, or hollowed objects, such as curved implements or utensils (Exod 25:29 and Num 7:86); the hollow or pocket of a sling (1 Sam 25:29); and the handle of a door bolt (Cant 5:5). Often כף is used in contexts related to placing something in someone’s hands (Exod 8:27, 28 and Num 5:18; 6:19), handfuls of something (Lev 9:17 and 1 Kgs 17:12), clapping hands together (Num 24:10; 2 Kgs 11:12; Ezek 6:11; and Ps 47:2), and grabbing or grasping something (Ezek 21:16 and Ezek 29:7, both with the verb תפש). It is also used a few times to refer to the sole (instep, which is the curved part) of the foot (usually expressed as כף רגל).

[9] כף and יד are used together in the same verse as synonyms in Gen 40:11; Exod 4:4; Ezek 21:16; and Ps 18:1, and they are placed in poetic parallelism in Isa 62:3; Jer 15:21; Ps 71:4; Prov 10:4; and Prov 31:19, 20. In none of these cases does there appear to be any distinction between כף and יד in terms of meaning. Sandra Jacobs, The Body as Property: Physical Disfigurement in Biblical Law, LHBOTS 582 (Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 165, 171–172, questions the translation of כף here as hand, pointing out that since כף often refers to the palm of the hand, perhaps that is the sense here, which would indicate a partial hand amputation (perhaps preserving the thumb). While this could be the case, this type of amputation is unattested in the ancient Near East. Given that כף and יד are commonly used as synonyms in the same verse or set of verses, the most likely meaning here for כף here is simply hand.

[10] There have been a few other, quite creative, suggestions for the punishment that hinge on different translations of קצץ and כף. Lyle Eslinger, “The Case of an Immodest Lady Wrestler in Deuteronomy 25:11-12,” VT 31 (1981): 269-81, translates קצץ as “to cut off” and כף as a term for genitalia, based on what he claims are two other usages of כף for genitalia elsewhere: Gen 32:26, 33, where it refers to the scrotum, and Cant 5:5, where it (euphemistically) refers to the labia. Based on this translation, he suggests that the wife’s punishment is genital mutilation in the form of female circumcision. Jerome Walsh, “You Shall Cut Off Her ... Palm? A Re-Examination of Deuteronomy 25:11-12,” JSS 49.1 (2004): 47-58, proposes that קצץ in this context should be translated as to cut or shave (hair), and that כף refers to the general pelvic region (groin), and thus the woman’s punishment is public humiliation through shaving of her pubic area. Neither of these translation suggestions have gained a wide following. For an astute analysis and critique of both, see Sandra Jacobs, “Instrumental Talion in Deuteronomic Law,” ZABR 16 (2010): 263-278 [265-269].

[11] The translation is from Martha T. Roth (ed.). Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, SBLWAW 6 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 2nd ed., 1997), 156-57, with slight adjustments. The ellipses indicate missing parts of the text. For a detailed discussion of what body part the final ellipses might have indicated, see Jacobs, “Instrumental Talion in Deuteronomic Law,” 272–274. Jacobs discusses all of the options that various scholars have suggested (eyes, breasts, nipples, fingers, thumbs) and concludes based on the available evidence that fingers or thumbs are the most likely option.

[12] A case from a trial record in Nuzi dating to about the 15th century B.C.E. also involves a woman committing what might be a similar offense and also includes a punishment involving the cutting off of a finger. It concerns the wife of a slave who intervened in a fight to help one of the men involved (who may or may not be her husband), and she put her hand on the aḥu of one of the other men fighting and drew blood, apparently injuring him at least to some extent in that area. She is brought to court, and after testimony from four witnesses against her, she is found guilty after refusing to undergo the ordeal of the oath of the gods, and the judge decrees that a fine must be paid as compensation to the man she assaulted for his injury, and he also seeks the consent of her master to cut off her finger. It is not clear if the cutting off of her finger is an additional punishment, or if her master had the option of choosing between compensation and mutilation. How similar this case is to MAL A 8 and Deut 25:11-12 depends on the translation of aḥu, the term used to denote the body part that was injured. When aḥu is used to refer to a human body part, it generally denotes the arm, and occasionally the side of the body. Cyrus H. Gordon, “A New Akkadian Parallel to Det. 25:11-12,” JPOS 15 (1935): 29-34, asserts that the term can also be used as a euphemism for genitalia, and that this is how it is used here. However, the usage of aḥu as a euphemism for genitalia is not attested anywhere else, so it is difficult to accept Gordon’s reading. If aḥu here refers to the man’s arm, a body part where it would be easy to draw blood during a fight (in contrast to the genitalia), then it is a simple case of assault, and the punishment fits in well with the way assault is treated in the Middle Assyrian Laws, but it doesn’t shed light on Deut 25:11-12. It does, however, tell us that cutting off fingers was considered an appropriate punishment for assault of a woman against a man in some cases in the larger ancient Near Eastern cultural milieu, and it may indicate that in some cases people may have had the option of a choice between monetary compensation and mutilation, but it is difficult to tell, since in this case the judge may have been seeking to punish the woman with both. Gordon’s suggestion that aḥu could be a euphemism for “privates” is based heavily on Deut 25:11-12 and MAL A 8 (see n. 6 in Gordon’s notes on his translation, 32-33), and thus his logic is rather circular. On the range of usages of the term aḥu, see CAD, vol. A, part 1, 205-210.

[13] The laws before and after MAL A 8 are also worth noting. The one before (MAL A 7) sentences a woman who hits a man to both a fine and a beating. Thus, there is something about women assaulting men that is being highlighted in both MAL A 7 and 8. The one after (MAL A 9) is a bit difficult to read in parts but seems to address a man who assaults a (possibly married) woman. If he lays a hand on her, he is punished with the loss of this finger. If he kisses her, one of his lips is cut off. Jacobs, “Instrumental Talion in Deuteronomic Law,” 271-275, identifies the punishments in MAL A 7,8, and 9 as instrumental talion: the offending organ is the locus of punishment in all three cases, just as is the case in Deut 25:11-12. For a translation of these texts, see Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, 156-157.

[14] The translations in the Septuagint and Targumim also reflect an understanding that cutting off the woman’s hand was the punishment. The translation of the first half of v. 12 in the Septuagint is ἀποκόψεις τὴν χεῖρα αὐτῆς , “You shall cut off her hand.” The verb ἀποκόψεις is commonly used in cases of cutting and chopping, and in a few other cases is specifically used in contexts of cutting off limbs. The word χεῖρα is the common word for hand, the equivalent of יד in the Hebrew Bible. See LSJ, 100. Targum Onqelos renders the woman’s sentence as “you shall cut off her hand” (ותקוץ ית ידה) and Targum Pseudo-Jonathan as “you shall cut off her hand up to the wrist” (ותקטעון ית פיסת ידה, following M. Jastrow, Dictionary of the Targumim, Talmud Babli, Yerushalmi, and Midrashic Literature [New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1903], 1168 on the translation of פיסת ידה).

[15] This is his name in MSS Munich 95 and Vatican 116 (where it is R. Judah ben R. Dostai). The printed editions have R. Dostai ben Judah.

[16] Gersonides is an exception here in that he interprets the sentence as mutilation, though he also allows for extenuating circumstances. On Rashi, Ibn Ezra, and Gersonides on this verse, see Carasik, The Commentators’ Bible, 169.

[17] This is the text as it appears in MSS Paris 176 and Frankfurt 150 and other editions. MS Paris 177 adds the words וכאשר לא תוכל להציל המוחזק מכפה, “when you cannot save who is held in her hand.” (MS information is taken from the AlHaTorah website.) This latter phrase follows the interpretation of R. Judah ibn Balaam (see below) and may have been added by a scribe uncomfortable with the implication of ibn Ezra’s interpretation.

[18] Though if the woman does sustain additional injury beyond miscarriage, it becomes a case of lex talionis, though the exact penalty is elusive. See discussion in, Sandra Jacobs, “Deathblows to a Pregnant Woman: What Restitution Was Required?” TheTorah (2020). Some correlations between Deut 25:11–12 and Exod 21: 22–25 are noteworthy: Both laws open with the same wording (כי ינצו אנשים, “if men are fighting”) and both address injuries (or potential injuries) that relate to loss of or possible potential loss of progeny caused by that situation. There are several significant differences, though. Deut 25:11-12 doesn’t say that the man suffered physical injury, while the woman in Exod 21:22-25 suffers a miscarriage. For the miscarriage itself, if that is the only harm done, the punishment is simply financial compensation. The woman in Deut 25:11-12, however, suffers the loss of her hand. While the wife’s intent is clear in the law in Deuteronomy, it is not clear from the description whether the man who injured the pregnant woman intended harm, or if it was by accident, or whether she tried to intervene or was just a bystander.

[19] Numbers 35:31, by prohibiting the use of such a payout in the case of a murder reveals that in other cases monetary compensation was an option.

[20] Other cases in which the admonishment “show no pity” occur (all of which are in Deuteronomy) involve severe penalties (the death penalty in Deut 13:9 and 19:13; and the possibility of the death penalty in Deut 19:21) with no mention of paying money as an alternative.

[21] Translated from the Arabic by Ma’aravi Peretz.

[22] It is likely that this is the meaning of the Tanna Qama (first opinion) in Sifrei Deuteronomy 293; the text speaks about “saving her” but this may derive from a scribe misunderstanding the derasha and adjusting it from the original “saving him.”

וקצתה את כפה—מלמד שאתה חייב להציל(ה)[ו] בכפה. מנין אם אין אתה יכול להציל אות(ה)[ו] בכפה הציל(ה)[ו] בנפשה? תלמוד לומר לא תחס עינך.

“Cut off her hand”—This teaches that you must save (her) [him] at the expense of her hand. How do you know that if you cannot save (her) [him] at the expense of her hand that you can save (her) [him] at the expense of her life? The text says “Show no pity.”

The text as is makes little sense, since she is not the one in danger; correcting the text to “him” in these cases yields the position of R. Judah ibn Balaam and Maimonides. Perhaps the fact that similar derashot appear in the case of rape (permission to kill the rapist if necessary) caused the confusion here.

[23] Translation by Eliyahu Touger (New York: Moznaim Publishing Corporation, 1997).

[24] Or, in case of Deut 19:21 in which the offense is bearing false witness, the potential damage. The principle of lex talionis, also called retaliative justice, is outlined in Exod 21:23-25; Lev 24:19-20; and Deut 19:21. For a discussion of how this principle is applied in both biblical law and narrative, see Jacobs, The Body as Property, 68-127.

[25] Jacobs, “Instrumental Talion in Deuteronomic Law,” 269. She credits Bernard Jackson with suggesting this term while supervising her doctoral research at the University of Manchester (n. 41).

[26] This explanation for the relationship between the punishment and the crime is the one most favored by contemporary scholars. For a survey of biblical, ancient Near Eastern, and post-biblical texts that apply this principle, see Yael Shemesh, “Punishment of the Offending Organ in Biblical Literature,” VT 55.3 (2005): 343-365. Examples include Num 5:11-31 (if the woman has committed adultery, the waters will affect her “thigh” and “belly.” In this case both terms probably refer to her reproductive organs, the very organs by which she sinned); 1 Kgs 13:4 (Jeroboam’s offending hand is withered); Ps 31:19 (the psalmist wishes for lying lips to be made speechless); Prov 30:17 (the eye that mocks a father or scorns obeying a mother will be gouged out by ravens and eaten by birds of prey); and Job 31:21–22 (Job states, in a form of self-imprecation, that if he has raised a hand against the fatherless, let his shoulder by dislocated and his arm broken). There are four cases in the Laws of Hammurabi where the hand, as the offending organ, is cut off (LH 195, for a son who strikes his father; LH 218, for a physician who either caused a patient’s death or destroyed his eye, LH 226, for a barber who shaves off the slave hair lock of someone’s slave without the owner’s consent, and LH 253, for someone who steals seed and fodder after being hired to cultivate a field).

[27] Eslinger, “The Case of an Immodest Lady Wrestler,” 277–281, offers a variation of this approach, arguing that the woman’s offense was committing an act of unfair intervention in a fight by employing a “below the belt” move. He sees this law as a result of the author’s reflections on Gen 32:25–33, in which Jacob and a divine entity are wrestling, and one, when he sees he is losing, resorts to an underhanded move against his opponent to gain the advantage. Eslinger argues that Jacob is the one who committed the underhanded move, not the divine entity (which is by far the more common interpretation), and that this law is the Deuteronomic authors’ critique of Jacob’s using such an underhanded method to gain the advantage, and a way of discouraging his audience from emulating Jacob’s tactics.

[28] This would entail not only being excluded from certain religious gatherings, but also being excluded from the public assembly, which means losing certain rights and privileges associated with citizenship. See Jeffrey Tigay, JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy (Philadelphia, JPS, 1996), 209-211, for a discussion of the significance of the Assembly of YHWH in ancient Israel and all of the implications for a man who is excluded from it. Somewhat similarly, Lev 21:17-23 lists the physical defects that would disqualify a male from the priestly line from functioning as a priest (from approaching the altar, thus making sacrifices), which includes crushed testes (v. 20). See also, David Glatt-Gilad, “The Prohibition of Joining the Assembly of the Lord,” TheTorah (2015).

[29] In several cases, body parts are grabbed hold of (hands in Gen 19.16; Isa 4:1; 41:13; and Jer 31:32, and feet in 2 Kgs 4:27) with no indication of harm. In cases in the Bible where physical harm or damage is related to the grasping or seizing, that harm or damage is noted by additional descriptors. See, e.g., Deut 22:25; Judg 19.25; 1 Sam 15.27; 17.35; 2 Sam 1:11; 2.16; 13:11; and 2 Kgs 2.12.

[30] John H. Elliott, “Deuteronomy - Shameful Encroachment on Shameful Parts. Deut 25:11-12 and Biblical Euphemism in Ancient Israel,” in The Old Testament in Its Social Context, ed. Phillip F. Essler (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 161–176 [168–169] provides a lengthy list of biblical euphemisms used for male and female genitalia.

[31] See, e.g., Gen 9:20–27; 2 Sam 6:20; Isa 47:3; Jer 13:26; Ezek 16:36–37; 23:10; and Nah 3:5. For an in depth study of shame in the Hebrew Bible (with a focus on the prophetic texts), see Johanna Stiebert, The Construction of Shame in the Hebrew Bible: The Prophetic Contribution, JSOTSup 346 (London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002).

[32] John Elliott sees the woman’s behavior as an egregious violation of gender boundaries that not only humiliates the man but brings profound shame on all concerned. The wife “transgressed into male space and violated the physical boundary of a male not her husband or relative.” The husband allowed his wife to engage in this behavior and not only needed but accepted her help in a situation in which women should not interfere, and the other man allowed “an ‘inferior’ female to get the better of him by grabbing his ‘family jewels,’ knocking him to his knees with her nutcracker grip, and violating his sanctum sanctorum.” Elliott, “Deuteronomy,” 172-173.

[33] Philo, The Special Laws, 3.31.169–172, 173–175, trans. F. H. Colson, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1937), 7.583-585. Philo continues his discussion of the importance of modesty by talking about how men and women should avoid seeing the other sex undressed, adding:

Surely, then, if it is reprehensible for them to use their sight, their hands are far more guilty. For the eyes often take liberties and compel us to see what we do not wish to see, but the hands are ranked among the parts which we keep in subjection, and render obedient service to our orders.

Philo, The Special Laws, 3.31.176-177. Colson, Philo, 585-587. For a discussion of Philo’s treatment of women, see Dorothy I. Sly, Philo’s Perception of Women, Brown Judaic Studies 290 (Atlanta: Scholar’s Press, 2020). For a discussion of how Philo deals with another Torah law about gender, see my, “The Prohibition of Cross-Dressing,” TheTorah (2018).

[34] On the custom of Levirate marriage generally and Deut 25:5–10 in particular, see Tigay, Deuteronomy, 231-234 and 482-483. For a perspective on this practice within the larger context of biblical law (including attempts in the Priestly and Holiness sources to put an end to the practice), see Dr. Hacham Isaac S. D. Sassoon, “The Priestly Repudiation of Yibbum,” TheTorah (2016).

[35] Rabbi Ovadia ben Jacob Sforno, in his commentary on Deuteronomy (ad loc), expands on this connection, claiming that the latter law reacts to the former by limiting the freedom of a woman to embarrass a man in public to ḥalitza only.

[36] Editor’s note: For a look at some of these laws, see Cynthia Edenburg, “Deuteronomy’s Uncompromising Demand for Women’s Sexual Fidelity,” TheTorah (2014).

[37] Editor’s note: For more on this view in the Bible, see Joel S. Baden, “God Opened Her Womb: The Biblical Conception of Fertility,” TheTorah (2017).

[38] Steffan Mathias, “Reproducing Torah: Human and Divine Sexuality in the Book of Deuteronomy,” Sexuality and Law in the Torah, LHBOTS 675 (ed. Hilary Lipka and Bruce Wells, Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2020), 217–238 [228–236].