To Protect Second Marriages, Deuteronomy Renders Palingamy Taboo

Druze family law imposes severe restrictions on the relationship between a man and his former wife, providing insight into the biblical prohibition of palingamy—a man remarrying his ex-wife, if she has married someone else in the interim.

Dr.

Elaine Goodfriend

Dr.

Elaine Goodfriend

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To Protect Second Marriages, Deuteronomy Renders Palingamy Taboo

Palingamy and the Druze

The Druze, residing in the mountainous terrain shared by Israel, Syria, and Lebanon, practice a religion that is a strict form of monotheism influenced by Shiite Islam (in addition to Christianity and Judaism), that goes back about a thousand years.^[1] Their communities are governed by their own religious courts in matters of family law.^[2] Druze law forbids palingamy,^[3] remarriage between former spouses; a divorce is absolute, irrevocable, and final.^[4]

The law and community also impose a complete severance of contact between the parties after the divorce. They may not sit in each other's company, and any communication must take place between intermediaries. The Islamic law scholar Aharon Layish (1933-2022) writes that, "If they meet by chance, the woman covers her face, and the man turns away his head."^[5]

Reinstating a divorced wife is considered by some Druze communities an act as offensive as adultery; sanctions may include expulsion from the community or acts of revenge akin to honor killing.^[6] If the couple insists on remarriage, they are forced to obtain a civil marriage or convert to another religion.^[7] The uniqueness of this ban to the Druze religion is so essential to their identity that for Shaykh Kamal Mu'adi, a Druze religious authority, its neglect will cause people to neglect other Druze precepts, both major and minor.^[8]

Some reasons offered by scholars for the draconian prohibition and separation between former spouses are:

Discouraging hasty divorce—Because the wall of separation is immediate and absolute, a couple cannot later change their mind and attempt to reinstate the marriage. According to Shaykh Kamal, only with the prohibition of reinstatement is divorce “placed on healthy religious-legal foundations.”^[9]

Community solidarity—Avoidance of conflict in public is a core value for the Druze, and unclarity regarding marital status can serve as an impediment.^[10]

Prevents moral ambiguity—The continuing contact of former spouses is believed to create social confusion, which is why the Druze have a complete ban on contact between the parties. For example, a divorced wife who goes back to the house of her husband to fetch her belongings does so in the presence of her father-in-law and other witnesses and in the absence of her husband.^[11]

The Druze practice, and the reasoning behind it, can help explain the biblical prohibition against remarrying your ex-wife after she has remarried.

The Biblical Prohibition of Remarrying after an Intervening Marriage

The Torah offers no comprehensive legislation regarding divorce in ancient Israel. A passage in Deuteronomy, however, does detail an elaborate case about a man who divorces his wife, who then remarries, and then her second husband divorces her, or alternatively, dies (Deut 24:1–3).^[12] The first husband is prohibited from remarrying her. If he does, it is an "abomination” that will “bring sin upon the land”:

^{דברים כד:ד} לֹא יוּכַל בַּעְלָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן אֲשֶׁר שִׁלְּחָהּ לָשׁוּב לְקַחְתָּהּ לִהְיוֹת לוֹ לְאִשָּׁה אַחֲרֵי אֲשֶׁר הֻטַּמָּאָה כִּי תוֹעֵבָה הִוא לִפְנֵי יְ־הֹוָה וְלֹא תַחֲטִיא אֶת־הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר יְ־הֹוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ נֹתֵן לְךָ נַחֲלָה.

^{Deut 24:4} Then the first husband who divorced her shall not take her to wife again, since she has been defiled^[13] – for that would be an abomination to YHWH. You must not bring sin upon the land that the YHWH your God is giving you as a heritage.^[14]

The reasons offered for the prohibition are not specific to remarriage; the terms תועבה, toʿebah, “abomination” and טמא, tame, “defiled, impure” are used elsewhere in the Torah regarding grave sins such as adultery, incest, murder, and the worship of other gods.^[15]

Several explanations have been offered for their application here:^[16]

To prevent legalized wife swapping—This explanation dates back to Rabbi Moses Nahmanides (ca. 1195–1270):

^{רמב"ן דברים כד:ד} וְטַעַם הַלָּאו הַזֶּה כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יַחְלִיפוּ נְשׁוֹתֵיהֶן זֶה לָזֶה, יִכְתֹּב לָהּ גֵּט בָּעֶרֶב וּבַבֹּקֶר הִיא שָׁבָה אֵלָיו.

^{Ramban Deut 24:4} And the reason for this prohibition is so that people should not exchange their wives with one another: he would be able to write her a bill of divorce at night, and in the morning, she will return to him.^[17]

And, similarly, R. Obadiah Sforno (ca. 1475–1550):

^{ספורנו דברים כד:ד} כִּי זֶה דֶּרֶךְ מָבוֹא לְנִאוּף, שֶׁיְּגָרֵשׁ אִישׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ לְבַקָּשַׁת הַנּוֹאֵף, שֶׁיִּקָּחֶנָּה לְאֵיזֶה זְמַן, וְיָשׁוּב בַּעֲלָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן לְקַחְתָּהּ.

^{Seforno Deut 24:4} For this is a gateway to adultery, the man will divorce his wife at the behest of the lover, who will take her for a short period, and then she will return to her first husband and he will take her back.

The law prevents using divorce and remarriage as a way to engage in wife swapping and other temporary arrangements.^[18]

Remarriage after divorce is akin to adultery—A woman having sex with one man, then another, and then returning to the first constitutes the same pattern as adulterous relations. This view is hinted at by Ibn Ezra (1089-1164):

^{אבן עזרא דברים כד:ד}והנה טעמו, טמאה היא לו בעבור שידעה איש אחר.

^{Ibn Ezra Deut 24:4}The reason that she is defiled for him is because she has had sexual relations with another man.

And Nahmanides:

^{רמב"ן דברים כד:ד} ועל דרך הפשט אחרי אשר הטמאה לבעל הראשון, ירמז כי כאשר ידעה איש אחר תחשב לו טמאה.

^{Ramban Deut 24:4} And according to the plain meaning of Scripture, the expression "after that she is defiled" refers to the first husband, the verse suggesting that because she “knew” another man she is accounted to him [the first husband] as “defiled.”^[19]

Since a man may not continue to live with a wife who committed adultery,^[20] he also may not take back a wife who has had relations (even within the legal framework of marriage) with another man.^[21]

To prevent unjust enrichment of the first husband—This observation was first made by the medieval French Talmudist and polymath Rabbi Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag, 1288–1344), as quoted by Don Isaac Abravanel (1437–1508):^[22]

^{אברבנאל דברים כד:א} והרלב"ג כתב בזה טעם אחר והוא שלא יהיה זה סבה לעשק וגזל. שזה יגרש את אשתו כדי שתנשא לאח' ותעש' לו פעולות רעות כדי שתהיה בעיניו רעה ויבא לגרש' ובזה תקח כל אשר לו ותחזור לבעל' הראשון וזה גזל וחמס מלבד הדופי הגדול שיזכה האדם את אשתי לתכלית קנין הממון.

^{Abarbanel Deut 24:1}Ralbag wrote of another reason – that the wife's remarriage to her first husband should not be the cause of monetary oppression and robbery, that one man would divorce his wife so she would marry another and do evil things in order that she would be evil in his eyes so that he (the second husband) would come to divorce her and she would take everything he had and return to her first husband and this is robbery and violence aside from the great duplicity that the man would impose on his wife for the purpose of gaining the victim's money.^[23]

Raymond Westbrook (1946–2009), a scholar of ancient Near Eastern law, seconds the idea that unjust enrichment is the issue.^[24] He proposes that the first husband divorced his wife with grounds, allowing him to send her off without a dowry or financial settlement.^[25]

In contrast, her second husband, who “hated” her but lacked objective grounds, divorced her with dowry and marital gifts intact (or he died). As a wealthy divorcee (or widow), she returns to her first husband who conveniently forgot his original objections. “Thus, he profits twice: firstly, by rejecting his wife and then by accepting her,” which for Westbrook, constitutes a “flagrant case of unjust enrichment.”^[26]

The explanations surveyed above, as Eve Levavi Feinstein discusses in her piece, “Remarrying Your Ex-Wife,” do not offer compelling reasons for the prohibition.

Protecting Second Marriages: Reuven Yaron

A more persuasive solution is offered by the Israelite legal historian Reuven Yaron (1924–2014), who argues that the prohibition aims to protect the second marriage, since a second marriage may be more vulnerable to ambient temptations. Perhaps the first husband sees that another man has very readily married his wife, and he experiences remorse that he divorced her. The ex-wife may have reluctantly entered a second marriage for social or economic reasons and perhaps compares her second husband unfavorably to her first.

Alternatively, her second husband may suffer from pangs of jealousy because of his wife's previous history of intimacy with another man. In a village setting like most of ancient Israel, avoiding the ex-spouse may be difficult or near impossible. Their common children or relatives likely necessitate frequent social contact.

Consider the ambiguity of their relationship as they were once sexually (and otherwise) intimate partners. Occasional interactions between the first husband and his ex-wife may be charged with familiarity (and desire!) because of their shared history and one of the two may make overtures to renew their union; alternatively, the second husband imagines this to be so. Deuteronomy is taking effective steps to ensure the stability and continuation of the wife's second marriage by making her previous divorce final and complete.^[27]

Deuteronomy Turns Remarriage into an Incest-like Taboo

Yaron suggests that laws regarding incest are designed to “isolate or insulate” existing relationships from the disruptive influences of sexual tension, and proposes that Deuteronomy makes this type of remarriage into an incest taboo.

For example, Leviticus creates a taboo against sexual relationships with certain family members in three ways:

Labelling the prohibited sexual relationships as an abomination (תועבה).^[28]
Requiring capital punishment if the couple is apprehended and the divine punishment of karet (the eventual end of the family line) if not.^[29]
Asserting that the land is defiled (טמא) by these forbidden relationships, leading to exile.^[30]

The reason for creating these taboos is that aversion to some of these sexual relationships is not innate, as is obvious by all those who transgress them as well as cross-cultural differences regarding which if any are taboo.^[31] By having these stringent incest taboos in place, Leviticus creates a situation in which a man (ideally) feels no sexual tension in being alone with his stepmother or daughter or sister.

Deuteronomy is attempting to do the same with its new and novel prohibition of palingamy, utilizing the language of defilement and sin and disgust (the rootsטמא andחטא and the noun תועבה).^[32] It prevents the possibility of reunion by declaring that it is as taboo as sexual relations with one’s mother or sister. It is noteworthy that remarriage after divorce once the woman has married another man is the only sexual act that Deuteronomy considers a תועבה , an abomination.

Yaron's insight that the law creates a novel taboo most akin to incest is buttressed by the similar prohibition imposed by Druze family law. The ban on remarriage obviates the ambiguity and confusion created by the ongoing contact of former spouses, which may spark hope for reconciliation to the detriment of subsequent marriages. The strength and stability of the nuclear family, the foundation of Israelite society, depends on its ability to isolate itself from such ambient temptations.

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Footnotes

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Published

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August 1, 2026

[1] See Nissim Dana, The Druze in the Middle East: Their Faith, Leadership, Identity, and Status (Sussex Academic Press, 2003). The origins of the faith date to the 11^th century C.E., with a religious figure named "Al-Hakim" who was also the sixth caliph of the Fatimid dynasty in Egypt (3). Dana notes that the Druze faith is "not a ritual-ceremonial faith" but rather a "neo-platonic philosophy" (17). It rejects several aspects of Islam, for example, the five daily prayers, fasting on Ramadan, and the haj to Mecca (18). In 2003, they numbered about one million (99).

[2] The Druze law of personal status in Israel (adopted in 1961) is based on statutes approved by Lebanon's parliament in 1948. One exception regards what actions determine the finality of divorce. In the Lebanese version, divorce is final with the verdict of the Qadi (religious judge); this is article 38 of the "Personal Status Laws of the Druze Sect in Lebanon" (Lubna Tarabey, Family Law in Lebanon: Marriage and Divorce among the Druze [I.B. Tauris, 2013], 221). In contrast, the version adopted by the Druze Religious Courts in Israel dictates that a divorce comes into force as soon as the husband announces before witnesses that he is divorcing his wife, without the ruling of a Qadi (Dana, The Druze, 133).

[3] "Palingamy" is the term used by Reuven Yaron, one of the legal scholars discussed in this essay, for remarriage between two people who were previously married to each other. It is composed of the Greek "palin," meaning "again" or "back," and "gamy," from Greek "gamos" meaning "marriage."

[4] Dana, The Druze, 138. The irrevocability of the divorce is the norm, but everyday practice admits the restoration of a marriage before the divorce has become final. In addition to the two standards indicated in note 2, another standard for some Druze legalists is when the last of the wife's belongings have been removed from her husband's home and his first payment of standard divorce payments has been made. For a detailed view of this issue, see Aharon Layish, "The Prohibition of Reinstating a Divorced Wife in the Druze Family," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 41 (1978): 259-261, 265.

[5] Layish, "The Prohibition," 260, 270.

[6] Layish, "The Prohibition," 262.

[7] Tarabey, Family Law, 100. Of course, some couples attempt in various ways to evade the harsh demands of the law; see Layish, "The Prohibition," 261-262.

[8] Layish, The Prohibition," 264.

[9] Layish, The Prohibition," 264.

[10] Lubna Tarabey, Family Law, 172-173.

[11] Layish, "The Prohibition," 260.

[12] These verses read:

^{דברים כד:א} כִּי יִקַּח אִישׁ אִשָּׁה וּבְעָלָהּ וְהָיָה אִם לֹא תִמְצָא חֵן בְּעֵינָיו כִּי מָצָא בָהּ עֶרְוַת דָּבָר וְכָתַב לָהּ סֵפֶר כְּרִיתֻת וְנָתַן בְּיָדָהּ וְשִׁלְּחָהּ מִבֵּיתוֹ. ^כד:ב וְיָצְאָה מִבֵּיתוֹ וְהָלְכָה וְהָיְתָה לְאִישׁ אַחֵר. ^כד:ג וּשְׂנֵאָהּ הָאִישׁ הָאַחֲרוֹן וְכָתַב לָהּ סֵפֶר כְּרִיתֻת וְנָתַן בְּיָדָהּ וְשִׁלְּחָהּ מִבֵּיתוֹ אוֹ כִי יָמוּת הָאִישׁ הָאַחֲרוֹן אֲשֶׁר לְקָחָהּ לוֹ לְאִשָּׁה.

^{Deut 24:}¹ A man takes a wife and possesses her. She fails to please him because he finds something obnoxious about her and he writes her a bill of divorcement, hands it to her, and sends her away from his house; ^24:2 she leaves his household and becomes the wife of another man; ^24:3 then this latter man rejects her, writes her a bill of divorcement, hands it to her, and sends her away from his house; or the man who married her last dies.

Bible translations are from NJPS with modifications. For a detailed discussion of this law, see Eve Levavi Feinstein, “Remarrying Your Ex-Wife,” TheTorah (2017).

[13] The claim that the divorcee has been defiled (הטמאה) should not be understood in a general sense, but rather that as a consequence of her second marriage, she is prohibited from remarriage to her first husband (and thus in some sense she is defiled in relation to him). There are no restrictions on her marrying anyone else.

[14] We need not assume that the stipulations included in this law should be generalized for every case of divorce in ancient Israel, as the purpose here is to prohibit remarriage after the woman has been married to a different man. For more on what we do know about divorce in ancient Israel, see Eve Levavi Feinstein, “When Is a Man Allowed to Divorce His Wife?”

[15] For adultery and defilement (טמא), see Num 5:11-29; for various kinds of illicit sex (including adultery, incest, male-male sexual relations, and bestiality) and defilement, with the label “abomination” (תועבה), see Leviticus 18, especially v. 24-30; for defilement (of the land) as the result of murder, see Num 35:33-34. For the use of the term "abomination" for the worship of other gods, see Deut 7:25; 12:31, 27:15.

[16] These are only a selection, briefly discussed. For a more detailed discussion of the various explanations that have been offered (including those not discussed, such as S.R. Driver’s suggestion that the intent of the law was to safeguard against a hasty or arbitrary divorce) and the strengths and weaknesses of each, see Feinstein, “Remarrying Your Ex-Wife,” as well as J. Carl Laney, “Deuteronomy 24:1-4 and the Issue of Divorce,” The Bibliotheca Sacra 149 (1992): 3-15; David I. Brewer, "Deuteronomy 24:1-4 and the Origin of the Jewish Divorce Certificate," Journal of Jewish Studies 49 (1998): 230-243; G. J. Wenham, "The Restoration of Marriage Reconsidered," Journal of Jewish Studies 30 (1979): 36-40; Carolyn Pressler, The View of Women Found in the Deuteronomic Family Laws (W. de Gruyter, 1993), 45-62; and Moshe A. Zipor, "Divorce and Restoration of Marriage," Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 20 (2014): 127-140.

[17] Translations of rabbinic texts are the author’s own or from the editors.

[18] Some modern interpreters have also suggested this reasoning behind the law, including Roy Gane, "Old Testament Principles Relating to Divorce and Remarriage," Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 12 (2001): 35-61 (52-53), and P.C. Craigie, The Book of Deuteronomy; NICOT (Eerdmans, 1976) 305, who comments, "If divorce became too easy, then it could be abused and it would become a 'legal' form of committing adultery." The plain sense of the text, on the other hand, contradicts this line of reasoning, as verses 1 and 3 state explicitly that both husbands desire to divorce their wife because of their dissatisfaction, not because they desire for some reason to "share." Further, verse 3 sees the woman as an active agent in her marital affairs as she goes and marries another man rather than being pandered by her husband.

[19] Related to this is the argument that there really is no such thing as divorce. Theoretically, the husband could have taken back his wife after he divorced her, but the interim marriage rendered her "defiled" because of the ideal expressed in Genesis 2:24, that marriage renders two people "one flesh." Thus, divorce is illusory; it cannot disrupt the essential unity of the couple. Sexual relations with any other man while her husband is still alive renders the woman off-limits for remarriage. See E. Lovestam, "Divorce and Remarriage in the New Testament," The Jewish Law Annual 4 (1981): 47-65. Support for this view is reflected in the Qumran scrolls and the Gospel of Mark (10:2-12), where Jesus of Nazareth insists that the prohibition of divorce goes back to the creation of humanity. See also Matt 5:31-32, Luke 16:18, and 1 Cor 7:10-11. Some in the Qumran sect also condemned divorce: The Damascus Document (CD), column 4, mentions those

...ניתפשים בשתים בזנות לקחת שתי נשים בחייהם ויסוד הבריאה זכר ונקבה ברא אותם ..

^{CD 4:19-5:1} …who are caught twice in fornication: by taking two wives in their lives, even though the principle of creation is "male and female He created them."

Translation from F. Garcia Martinez, ed., The Dead Sea Scrolls Translated: The Qumran Texts in English, trans. William G.E. Watson (Brill, 1994), 36. Ultimately, however, this explanation for the prohibition of remarriage fails because Deuteronomy has no intention to delegitimize divorce nor even express disapproval of it; she is free to find a third or even a fourth husband; she is simply prohibited to remarry her first.

[20] This is not explicit in the Bible, but it is implied by Numbers 5's emphasis on the adulteress being defiled/impure. See also Ezekiel 18:6,11,15; 33:26. In rabbinic law, it is found in Mishnah Sota 5:1.

[21] Pressler, The View of Women Found in the Deuteronomic Family Laws, 60-61, reasons that, "we are pushed to interpret the relationship prohibited by the law as analogous to adultery. Adultery involves a woman having sexual relations with man A, then man B, then again man A. Deut 24:1-4 prohibits just such a pattern of sexual relations, even when the first and second relationships were legally contracted and legally dissolved." Mordechai Friedman, "Reinstatement of One's Ex-Wife Following Her Remarriage, and the Impurity of an Adulteress and a Rape Victim," in Saul Lieberman Memorial Volume, ed. Shamma Friedman (JTS, 1993), 189-195 [Hebrew], sees the prohibition of palingamy as rooted in the "absolute nature" of adultery in Israelite law. According to this reasoning, while the woman's marital life may include even a third or fourth husband, once she returns to her previous husband, her subsequent marriages count as adulterous retroactively. This view, however, is problematic because it posits that a law code can ignore the legal nature of the wife's second marriage. In the words of Reuven Yaron, "The Restoration of Marriage," Journal of Jewish Studies 17 (1966): 1-11 (6-7), "She acted in a perfectly legal manner, marrying another husband after being dismissed by the first. A crime cannot be committed in a lawful fashion."

[22] Don Isaac Abrabanel quotes Ralbag (Levi ben Gershon, Gersonides) in his commentary on Deut 24:4; Ralbag expresses different ideas in his commentary (Ralbag on the Torah, Venice edition, 1759, volume 2, 233, found at https://hebrewbooks.org/19194).

[23] In this scenario, a man uses his wife to gain access to the wealth of her second husband, but it is unclear how he can be certain that the second man would marry her or divorce her and that she would leave with any wealth. Nevertheless, his explanation focusses on the first husband's greed as the motive in divorcing his wife and then taking her back.

[24] Raymond Westbrook, "The Prohibition of the Restoration of Marriage in Deuteronomy 24:1-4," in Studies in Bible, ed. Sara Japhet (Magnes, 1986), 387-405. This, according to Weinfeld, prompts Deuteronomy to label the remarriage an "abomination" (תועבה). Westbook references Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Clarendon, 1972), 269, who wrote that the term תועבה in Deuteronomy is used to emphasize "the hypocritical attitude of the malefactor." This principle would apply to the motivation for remarriage as reconstructed by Westbrook. He introduces the legal principle of estoppel, which precludes a person from profiting by asserting a particular set of facts which are contrary to his/her previous assertions.

[25] His grounds for divorce are based on the supposedly grave accusation of ערות דבר, erwat dabar (v.1). For a discussion of this phrase and the various ways it has been interpreted, see Feinstein, "When Is a Man Allowed to Divorce His Wife?" TheTorah (2018).

[26] Westbrook, “The Prohibition of the Restoration of Marriage,” 404. Westbrook’s interpretation, however, raises questions about the application of the law. Does the law prohibit remarriage only in cases in which the first husband profits from taking his wife back? If the first husband was wealthy and the second husband poor, could the former take back his wife? Would there be a specific judge or accountant to whom the first husband and his divorcee would appeal? If Westbrook's interpretation is correct, does the prohibition of remarriage apply when this is not the case? This specific application of the law runs contrary to practicality, but also its interpretation in early Jewish law, where it is taken as a blanket prohibition of remarriage after an interim union. Jer 3:1-2, our earliest interpretation of Deut 24:1-4, seems to have such an understanding. For this thought, see Zipor, “Divorce and Restoration of Marriage,” 137, who comments that Westbrook's “approach runs contrary to the legal and exegetical tradition at least starting from Jeremiah,” who understood the law as a blanket prohibition.

[27] Yaron, “The Restoration of Marriage,” 1–11. Those who object with this interpretation contend that Yaron "fails to account for the provision that the law applies if the second husband dies" (Feinstein, "Remarrying Your Ex-Wife"; see also Westbrook, "The Prohibition of Restoration of Marriage," 390; G.J. Wenham, "The Restoration of Marriage Reconsidered," 37). On the other hand, the wife and her first husband could be waiting for the death of her second husband to remarry and he or she may passively or actively contribute to this inevitability. Alternatively, the second husband believes this to be so. David's marriage to Abigail might exemplify a similar situation (1 Samuel 25); Zipor, "Divorce and Restoration of Marriage," 134, notes that this kind of theme is very common in world literature.

[28] Leviticus 18:24–30.

[29] Leviticus 20:11,12, 14; for karet (Lev 18:29; 20:17), see Jacob Milgrom, Numbers (Doubleday, 2000), Excursus 36, "The Penalty of 'Karet,'" 405-408; he holds that the term can refer to the termination of the offender's line or the offender's inability to join his ancestors in the afterlife. Prohibited sexual relations in Leviticus 18 and 20 are not limited to incest, but also include acts such as adultery, male-male sexual relations, and bestiality.

[30] Leviticus 18:24–30; 26:14–38. This last is on the collective level.

[31] While we might assume a universal loathing for marriage or with half-siblings, this is apparently not so in the Bible (Gen 20:12; 2 Samuel 13) nor in parts of the ancient world: Children of the same father but different mothers were considered less closely related in a large patrilineal household. The Torah's ban on male homosexuality, unique in the ancient world, is another example of a sexual taboo that is unique to particular societies (Milgrom, Leviticus 17-22, 1566). Today first cousin marriage is considered objectionable in Western Europe and its cultural descendants, due to the influence of a first-cousin taboo in Catholic law. In other parts of the world, perhaps 10-20% of marriages take place between first cousins. See Alan Bittles, "Consanguinity and Its Relevance to Clinical Genetics," Clinical Genetics 60 (2001): 89-98 (90).

[32] The former wife is labeled hutama’ah (הטמאה), a unique form of the root טמא, "to defile/be impure" (a passive form of the hitpa‘el, called a hotpa‘al). The root appears eight times in Deuteronomy and six times just in Leviticus 18 and 20. Deut 24:4's use of the root חטא in the hiphil with "the land" as its object is suggestive of defilement; see its parallel in Jer 3:2 with חנף which refers to pollution. The relative clause "which YHWH your God is giving you an as inheritance" suggests that it is the land itself is the object.