Murder

Egyptian and Mesopotamian abortion-inducing recipes attest to the practice of abortion in the ancient Near East. While the Middle Assyrian Laws prohibit the practice, the Torah offers no ruling. Nevertheless, throughout the Bible, expressions like נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים, “the breath of life” (Genesis 2:7), imply that life begins at first breath.

The author of Numbers 35 uses an existing set of laws that distinguish between murder and manslaughter to determine what kind of killer may escape to a city of refuge. This creates confusion about what it means to be a rotzeach (“murderer” or “killer”) and who executes the murderer: the assembly or the blood avenger?

The Torah allows kin to take vengeance on a murderer; in cases of manslaughter, the killer is offered sanctuary at a refuge city. These laws highlight the struggle to limit clan justice in ancient Israel, a challenge found centuries earlier among the northern Amorites, as detailed in several letters to King Zimri-Lim of Mari.

God rejects Cain’s sacrifice while accepting Abel’s, then in the next scene, Cain kills his brother. Does this mean that Cain killed Abel out of jealousy, or could other factors have been present? Ancient interpreters explore many possible motivations, from the simple to the bizarre.

A mother’s joy, loss, and recovery serves as an etiology of human grief.

When a man accidentally kills a pregnant woman in a brawl, Exodus requires him to pay “life for a life.” This is generally understood as either capital punishment or monetary repayment. Its legal formulation in context, however, suggests substitution, i.e., the offender has to hand over a woman from his own family.

Was Israel ever a tribal society? Although some scholars accept the Bible’s depiction of Israel’s pre-monarchic society as a confederation of tribes, others have dismissed this as ahistorical. Can a study of biblical law help us resolve this question?

The author of the Covenant Collection in Exodus knew the Laws of Hammurabi and revised them to fit with Israelite legal and ethical conceptions. This is clear when we compare their laws of assault in each.

A struggling ex-slave and single mother labors against all odds to raise her son and shield him from the prejudices of the surrounding community.

Pinchas is portrayed as a hero in the Torah and Second Temple sources for killing Zimri and his Midianite lover, Cozbi. Rabbinic sources struggle with the absence of any juridical process or deliberative body, which contravenes their own judicial norms, and therefore recast or minimize his act in subtle ways.

The Torah first describes a world that is created to be vegetarian. It is only after the Flood that humans were allowed to eat meat. Leviticus restricts meat consumption to the sacrificial offerings only, whereas Deuteronomy permits even non-consecrated meat. How do we understand the tension between these approaches?

Reading Cain’s murder of Abel and the account of Cain’s descendants as a metaphor for the trajectory of human development and the change in patterns of human behavior.

If a corpse is found in a field, and the killer is unknown, Deuteronomy 21 requires the elders of the closest city to break a heifer’s neck by a stream and declare that they did not spill “this blood.” How does this ritual of eglah arufah, “broken-necked heifer,” atone for Israel’s bloodguilt?

What does the root רצח actually mean: to kill or to murder? A look at Rashbam’s attempted (and failed?) solution highlights the ethical ramifications of Bible translation.

The law of the heifer whose neck is broken, eglah arufah, has puzzled both traditional and modern commentators. What is it meant to accomplish? How does it work?